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A STANDARD FOR SALVATION: EVALUATING
“HYBRID-RIGHTS” FREE-EXERCISE CLAIMS
William J. Haun+
President Thomas Jefferson, whose own epitaph proudly cites to his
authorship of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom,1 referred to the
liberty rights guaranteed by the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause2 as
“the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights.”3 Yet, the current
free-exercise doctrine, as defined by the Supreme Court in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,4 actually
allows states to restrict free exercise through facially “neutral [and] generally
applicable” laws.5 Except in the “the extreme and hypothetical situation in
+

J.D. Candidate, May 2012, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., American University. The author would like to thank Professor Mark Rienzi for his
wisdom and encouragement, and John C. Raffetto for his dedication and insight. The author
would also like to dedicate this Comment to his parents, Bill and Lisa Haun, and his fiancée,
Caroline Simms, for proving throughout this process that love is indeed patient and kind.
1. Considering it one of his greatest achievements, President Jefferson desired that his
tombstone reflect his drafting of the statute, which influenced the First Amendment’s religion
clauses, as well as the religion clauses in various state constitutions. See Thomas Jefferson
Found., Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, MONTICELLO CLASSROOM,
http://classroom.monticello.org/kids/resources/profile/262/Virginia-Statute-for-Religious-Freedo
m/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2011).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Thomas Jefferson, An Exact Transcript of the Minutes of the Board of Visitors of
Virginia, During the Rectorship of Thomas Jefferson, in 19 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 361, 416 (Thomas Jefferson Mem’l Ass’n ed., 1903); see also Michael W.
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1409, 1425 (1990) (explaining that the concept of religious free exercise was a
component of American colonial law from as early as 1648, when Lord Baltimore of Maryland
took action to protect Roman Catholics from persecution by the new Protestant governor).
4. 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990), superseded in part by statute, Religious Freedom Restitution
Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-4), as recognized in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006). Smith was originally superseded by the Religious Freedom
Restitution Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488. However, the
Supreme Court held the Act unconstitutional as applied to state and local government through the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
536 (1997). Congress responded by amending the Act to apply only to the federal government.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to 2000bb-2 (2006). Therefore, the rule in Smith, discussed in this
Comment as the constitutional standard for the Free Exercise Clause, is still applicable to states
that have not enacted legislation mirroring the RFRA.
5. 494 U.S. at 878 (holding that a generally applicable law does not offend the First
Amendment as long as its object is not to burden free exercise, even if the law incidentally has
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which a State directly targets a religious practice,”6 the Smith rule removes the
Free Exercise Clause as a source of protection against state laws that burden
religious exercise.7
The Court in Smith purported to leave religious liberty claimants with an
avenue of relief from neutral and generally applicable legislation burdening
their free exercise.8 However, the Smith rule “only”9 exempts from these
neutral and generally applicable laws those claims that implicate other
constitutional provisions in addition to the free-exercise claim.10 The Court
has applied this hybrid exemption when the claim involved a “communicative
activity” protected by the First Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment’s
“parental right.”11 Supporters and critics of the Court’s judgment in Smith
view such “hybrid” claims as a judicially crafted contrivance to distinguish
relief-friendly precedent from the Smith rule.12 Historical fact supports this
cynicism: in the twenty years since Smith, the Supreme Court has not formally

such an effect). The question of facial neutrality—whether a law discriminates against a
particular religion within its plain language—is not limited to statutory interpretation. See
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534–35 (1993)
(“Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by
mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects
against governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt. . . . Apart from the text, the
effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.”).
6. Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
7. See id. at 893.
8. See id. at 881 (majority opinion).
9. Id. In Smith, the Court foreclosed the use of another potential exception to the general
rule announced, by explicitly confining the Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963),
“substantial-burden” test, which would have allowed certain government actions to be
invalidated, to the unemployment-benefits context. See id. at 882-85 (showing no “inclin[ation] to
breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment compensation field”).
10. Id. at 881. The Court referred to this type of claim as a “hybrid” situation. Id. at 882.
11. Id. at 881–82 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 25 (1972); Follett v. McCormick,
321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania., 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut.
310 U.S. 296 (1940)).
12. See id. at 896 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The Court endeavors to escape from our
decisions in Cantwell and Yoder by labeling them ‘hybrid’ decisions . . . but there is no denying
that both cases expressly relied on the Free Exercise Clause . . . and that we have consistently
regarded those cases as part of the mainstream of our free exercise jurisprudence.” (citations
omitted)); id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[The majority] mischaracteriz[es] this Court’s
precedents. The Court discards leading free-exercise cases such as [Cantwell and Wisconsin] as
‘hybrid.’” (citations omitted)); see also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and
the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121 (1990) (“One suspects that the notion of
‘hybrid’ claims was created for the sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder in this case.”); William
P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 309 n.3
(1991) (“The Court’s claim that [Wisconsin] was decided on the basis of a ‘hybrid’ constitutional
right . . . is particularly illustrative of poetic license.” (citations omitted)).
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revisited hybrid situations,13 and no federal court has justified strict scrutiny of
a free-exercise claim based on the hybrid-rights theory alone.14 A near
majority of federal circuit courts have dismissed the hybrid-rights precedent
acknowledged in Smith as “completely illogical” dictum.15 Even those circuits
that nominally permit hybrid claims struggle to employ a consistent, workable
standard for assessing such claims.16
The Supreme Court’s sole discussion of hybrid rights after it decided Smith
falls within one paragraph of Justice David Souter’s concurrence in Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, in which he denigrated Smith and its
hybrid exception as “untenable.”17 Justice Souter further derided the exception
as either too large or too insignificant to exempt certain free-exercise claimants
from laws of general applicability.18 These criticisms provided the foundation
for the rationales articulated by those circuits rejecting the hybrid-rights
exception.19
13. As discussed infra in notes 17–19 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court mentions
hybrid rights post-Smith only in Justice Souter’s Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v. City of
Hialeah concurrence, and in a passing reference in City of Boerne v. Flores. See Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566–67 (1993) (Souter, J.,
concurring); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513–14 (1997).
14. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 88 (Cal. 2004).
15. See infra Part I.E (discussing the treatment of hybrid-rights theory in the federal circuit
courts); see also infra Part I.D (discussing Justice Souter’s criticism of Smith’s hybrid-rights
discussion in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye).
16. Although the D.C. Circuit entertains hybrid-rights claims—provided an independently
viable companion claim is joined with the free-exercise claim—it has not elaborated on how to
evaluate such claims. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (demonstrating the existence of a hybrid claim within the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause by successfully establishing that the “EEOC’s attempt to enforce Title VII
would both burden Catholic University’s right of free exercise and excessively entangle the
Government in religion”); see also infra Part I.E. Only the Tenth Circuit developed a doctrine of
analysis for hybrid rights, which assessed whether the companion claim to the free-exercise claim
is “colorable” enough to suggest a constitutional violation on its own. See Swanson v. Guthrie
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 136 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998). Other circuits, including the Fifth,
Seventh, and Eighth, endorse the notion of hybrid claims but have not provided an analytical
approach. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 764–65 (7th Cir.
2003); Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 473–74 (8th Cir. 1991);
Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 1991), aff’d on reh’g en
banc, 959 F.2d 1283, 1289 (5th Cir. 1992).
17. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 566–67 (Souter, J., concurring). The
Court’s passing reference to hybrid rights in City of Boerne v. Flores provides little in the way of
analysis. See 521 U.S. at 513–14 (“The only instances where a neutral, generally applicable law
had failed to pass constitutional muster, the Smith Court noted, were cases in which other
constitutional protections were at stake . . . [These] case[s] implicated not only the right to the
free exercise of religion but also [another constitutional claim].”).
18. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 567; see also infra Part I.D.
19. See, e.g., Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., Coll. of Veterinary Med., 5
F.3d 177, 179 n.1 (6th Cir. 1993) (asserting that Justice Souter’s concurrence strengthens the
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Failing to entertain and evaluate hybrid claims renders the Free Exercise
Clause irrelevant unless a state is “naive” enough to “enact a law directly
prohibiting or burdening a religious practice as such.”20 Without hybrid
analysis, victims of subtle religious discrimination lack the “affirmative
individual liberty” guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause, which would be
necessary to assert a claim against the government.21 Additionally, without
such analysis those cases that the Supreme Court distinguished as hybrids in
Smith lose their precedential value despite the Court’s expressly preserving
them.22 Absent a recognition of and standard for hybrid rights condoned by
precedent and responsive to critics, the Free Exercise Clause stands reduced as
only a weak guardian of religious liberty.23
conclusion that Smith’s treatment of hybrid-rights claims is dicta). Every circuit court that has
rejected hybrid rights has cited to Kissinger. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
20. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., concurring), superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107
Stat. 1488, 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as
recognized in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424
(2006).
21. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 578 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(remarking that Smith “ignored the value of religious freedom as an affirmative individual
liberty” asserted against the state, and lowered the Free Exercise Clause into “no more than an
antidiscrimination principle”).
22. See Smith, 492 U.S. at 881–82. See also Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n,
165 F.3d 692, 704 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that because the Court’s opinion distinguished
Cantwell, Murdock, Follett, and Yoder, those cases are still binding on lower courts, and Smith’s
treatment of hybrid rights should not be disregarded), withdrawn and reh’g granted, 192 F.3d
1208 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated en banc as not ripe, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
23. Multiple scholarly articles discuss hybrid rights from a variety of perspectives, but none
have identified a standard from Supreme Court precedent in light of Justice Souter’s criticism.
Instead, the vast majority of articles either consider Smith’s language and its implications, or
explain why a particular circuit’s approach taken is preferable for hybrid rights. See, e.g.,
Bertrand Fry, Note, Breeding Constitutional Doctrine: The Provenance and Progeny of the
“Hybrid Situation” in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 833, 834–35,
862–63 (1993) (considering the language of Smith to predict how the hybrid-rights doctrine could
unfold); Jonathan B. Hensley, Comment, Approaches to the Hybrid-Rights Doctrine in Free
Exercise Cases, 68 TENN. L. REV. 119, 120 (2000) (commenting on the flawed logic of the
hybrid-rights doctrine and examining post-Smith treatment of the doctrine); Timothy J. Santoli,
Note, A Decade After Employment Division v. Smith: Examining How Courts Are Still
Grappling with the Hybrid-Rights Exception to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 649, 651 (2001) (exploring the implications of Smith with a focus on the
need for further judicial guidance); John L. Tuttle, Note, Adding Color: An Argument for the
Colorable Showing Approach to Hybrid Rights Claims Under Employment Division v. Smith, 3
AVE MARIA L. REV. 741, 742 (2005) (advocating the “colorable showing approach” as the best
approach to hybrid rights). Other articles elaborate on how courts hold hybrid rights in disregard.
See Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a “Rule” Doesn’t Rule: The Failure of the Oregon
Employment Division v. Smith “Hybrid Rights Exception,” 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 573, 609
(2003) (finding that parties have generally been unsuccessful on hybrid-rights claims). Still
others developed their own approach based on the Smith opinion. See Benjamin I. Siminou, Note,
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This Comment will address the existence and analysis of hybrid claims,
illustrating how Smith both confirms the existence of hybrid rights and
provides an analytical roadmap to handle hybrid-right claims. After outlining
Smith’s rule, this Comment explains how the Supreme Court has distinguished
precedent from Smith’s rule and highlights previous applications of hybrid
analysis. Next, this Comment considers the fate of a free-exercise claim
without hybrid rights in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings
College of Law v. Martinez (CLS).24 This Comment then addresses Justice
Souter’s criticism of the hybrid rights in Smith and the credibility his critique
offers to circuit courts that reject or ignore hybrid analysis. After exploring
both sides of the hybrid-rights argument, this Comment describes the different
approaches taken by circuit courts wrestling with hybrid analysis. From these
varied approaches, this Comment demonstrates the necessity of a hybrid
analysis, and argues that the Court’s treatment of hybrid-rights precedent in
Smith, considered with the Court’s hybrid analysis, provides an appropriate
standard. This Comment tests that standard against Justice Souter’s criticisms,
and explains how the Court could have found a successful hybrid-rights claim
in CLS. Finally, this Comment concludes that the Supreme Court should
reaffirm hybrid-rights claims and the existing evaluative standard, and
encourages religious-liberty plaintiffs to bring claims that can resolve the
remaining interstices in hybrid-rights analysis.
I. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND ASSESSMENTS OF HYBRID CLAIMS
A. A Maculate Conception: Smith Carves out Hybrid Rights
In the late 1980s, the Employment Division of Oregon’s Department of
Human Resources refused to provide unemployment benefits to two
individuals who were fired for consuming peyote.25 Challenging the denial,
these individuals argued that their consumption of the hallucinogen was
sacramental and, accordingly, protected by the Free Exercise Clause.26
Making Sense of Hybrid Rights: An Analysis of the Nebraska Supreme Court’s Approach to the
Hybrid-Rights Exception in Douglas County v. Anaya, 85 NEB. L. REV. 311, 314 & n.12 (2006)
(arguing that the “genuinely implicated” approach should be used when addressing hybrid-rights
claims).
24. 130B S. Ct. 2971, 2995 n.27 (2010) (concluding that the Smith decision precludes the
Christian Legal Society’s (CLS) from arguing that the university’s rule requiring student groups
to accept “all-comers” violates the Free Exercise Clause). There was no mention of hybrid rights
in CLS.
25. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (1990) (noting Smith and Black were fired for violating ORE.
REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987), which defined “controlled substances” to include peyote, in
accordance with 21 U.S.C. §§ 811–812 (2006)).
26. Id. at 874. The Court in Smith explained the state-level appellate history, along with the
case’s initial presence before the Supreme Court in 1987 regarding the relevancy of the legality of
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In Smith, the Supreme Court began its evaluation of this claim with the
uncontroversial statement that the Free Exercise Clause “obviously excludes
all ‘governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.’”27 The clause
accordingly has been used to prohibit government-compelled affirmation of
religious belief, proscribing or prohibiting particular forms of religious
expression, or the government lending its weight to a given side within an
intra-religious dogmatic dispute.28 Yet, the Court in Smith considered the
respondents’ argument—that the Free Exercise Clause mandates a religiousbased exemption to a facially nondiscriminatory and generally applied law that
forbids performance of an act required by their religion—to go “one large step
further” than the clause’s textual commission.29
After excluding exemption as a form of relief available to the respondents,
the Court distinguished earlier precedent that had granted such relief so
prohibited by Smith’s rule.30 The Court clarified that these prior cases
possessed exemption-worthy claims because the Free Exercise Clause did not
act alone, but rather conjoined with constitutional rights protected by the First
Amendment or the constitutionally recognized parental right—so-called hybrid
situations.31 These companion claims protected different rights—the First
Amendment’s “communicative activit[ies]” of speech, press, and association,32
the claimant’s peyote use to their free-exercise argument. Id. at 874–75. The Court’s explanation
of this history suffices for the purposes of this Comment. When the Oregon Supreme Court
ultimately found the Oregon criminal statute invalid as applied to the sacramental consumption of
peyote under the Free Exercise Clause and ruled that the law could not deny them unemployment
benefits on those grounds, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case. Id. at 876.
Using the argument vindicated by Sherbert v. Verner, respondents asserted that Oregon’s criminal
statute substantially burdened their religious practice and, therefore, required justification from a
compelling government interest to sustain the prohibition. Id. at 882–83 (citing Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1968)).
27. Id. at 877 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 559–60 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (referring to
Smith’s assertion that free exercise is not offended by the enforcement of a neutral and generally
applicable law as a “noncontroversial principle”).
28. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877; see also, McConnell, supra note 3, at 1425 (discussing the
historical underpinnings of religious free-exercise protections and their influence on the founding
generation).
29. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. However, the Court hedged its holding as a textual matter when
it conceded that the respondents’ proposed reading was “permissible,” but ultimately concluded,
“we do not think the words must be given that meaning.” Id. (emphasis added).
30. See id. at 881–82.
31. Id.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Court in Smith pointed to previous Supreme Court cases
that involved various hybrid claims implicating First Amendment rights. Smith, 494 U.S. at
881–82. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court invalidated a religious-solicitation licensing
system because it gave the administrator discretion to refuse a license request whenever he
believed the cause to be nonreligious. 310 U.S. 298, 304–07 (1940). In Murdock v. Pennsylvania
and Follett v. McCormick, the Court invalidated flat taxes on solicitation as they were applied to
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and the constitutionally recognized “right of parents . . . to direct the education
of their children.”33 Separately, the Smith Court recognized that some cases
presented hybrid situations because religious beliefs motivated the claimant’s
desire for an exemption; however, the Court concluded those cases, which
involved compelled expression, had been decided solely under the Free Speech
Clause.34
The Court further recognized that in communicative hybrid cases the nexus
between the communicative activity and free exercise is within “the
communication of religious beliefs.”35 Additionally, Smith acknowledged that
the parental right and free exercise combine within “the raising of one’s
children in those [religious] beliefs.”36 The Smith Court found in each
precedential case involving hybrid rights that its analysis had focused
specifically on the other constitutional principles involved, rather than free
exercise.37 After explaining how it had previously resolved hybrid claims, the
Court applied the hybrid requirements to the facts presented in Smith.38
Finding that ingesting peyote is unconnected to any communicative activity or
parental right, the Court held that no hybrid claim existed.39
B. Separating Sheep from Goats40: Hybrid-Rights Successes and Failures
In explicating the free-exercise doctrine, the Court in Smith cited Supreme
Court precedent that both upheld and rejected hybrid claims, and set forth the
factual scenarios in which each claim arose.41

the dissemination of religious ideas. Murdock, 319 U.S. 105, 112–15 (1943); Follett, 321 U.S.
573, 577–78 (1944). The Court also indicated the potential for hybrid claims involving free
exercise and freedom of association. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 622 (1984)).
33. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)).
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court invalidated laws mandating school attendance as applied to
Amish parents refusing to comply for religious reasons. 406 U.S. 205, 234–36 (1972).
34. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977); W. Va.
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
35. Id. at 882.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 881 n.1.
38. Id. at 882. The Court addressed the respondents’ Sherbert-based argument after it
explained the hybrid-rights exception, creating the impression that the two are separate exceptions
to Smith’s general free-exercise rule. See id at 881–83. Additionally, the Court’s confinement of
Sherbert to the unemployment-compensation context, even though the hybrid-rights exception
contains no such caveat, provides further indication of their analytical separation. See supra
note 9.
39. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
40. Matthew 25:32 (“And before him shall be gathered all nations: and he shall separate
them one from another, as a shepherd [divideth] his sheep[] from the goats.”).
41. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879–82.
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1. “Communicative Activity” Hybrid Cases
The Smith Court characterized Cantwell v. Connecticut42 and Murdock v.
Pennsylvania43 as successful hybrid cases involving a communicative activity
in conjunction with a free-exercise claim.44 In Cantwell, the Court invalidated
a Connecticut statute that provided an administrator the discretion to refuse a
license to solicit support for a religious cause if he believed the cause to in fact
be non-religious.45 Although the Court by its words based this holding on the
“freedom to act” under the Free Exercise Clause, the particular act involved
was solicitation of support for religious views—an act that by its very nature
constitutes a communicative activity.46 The Court additionally held that that
the petitioner’s conviction for breach of the peace must be set aside.47 The
Court reasoned that prosecutions for breaching the peace at common law of a
general and undefined nature countered the interest of the United States in
protecting the free exercise of religion and “the freedom to communicate
information and opinion.”48 The Court in Smith interpreted Cantwell to stand
for the principle that the First Amendment prevents prosecution of religious
free exercise when doing so would contemporaneously abridge the freedom to
communicate information within the Free Speech Clause.49
Murdock v. Pennsylvania involved another solicitation statute, which
required anyone soliciting orders for goods and other items in Jeannette,
Pennsylvania to pay a fee and obtain a license.50 Local Jehovah’s Witnesses
were arrested for soliciting people to buy religious books without first
acquiring such a license.51 The Supreme Court, agreeing with the Jehovah’s
Witnesses’ First Amendment challenge, equated the statute’s licensing fee to
“a tax [on a preacher] . . . for the privilege of delivering a sermon.”52 When
the combined concerns of free exercise and freedom of the press “ma[d]e [free]
exercise so costly as to deprive [the religion] of the resources necessary for its

42. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
43. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
44. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. The Smith Court acknowledged that Follett v. Town of
McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944), also dealt with a hybrid-rights claim. Id. However, because
the Court considered the case facts and holding with regard to hybrid rights in Follett to be the
same as those in Murdock, this Comment does not separately analyze Follett. Id.
45. See 310 U.S. at 303–06.
46. See id. at 303–04.
47. Id. at 310–11.
48. Id. at 302–03, 307.
49. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82.
50. 319 U.S. 105, 106 (1943).
51. Id. at 106–07.
52. Id. at 112.
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maintenance,”53 the rights protected by the First Amendment prohibited
prosecution as they had in Cantwell.54
2. Communicative Cases Decided Based on the Freedom of Speech Alone
In Smith, the Court considered certain exemption-granting cases to be hybrid
situations because, although they exclusively involved a free-speech claim, the
cases factually arose from burdens placed on the respective claimants’
religious exercise.55 The Smith Court cited both West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette56 and Wooley v. Maynard57 as falling within this
category of cases.58
Barnette involved a free-speech and free-exercise challenge to a resolution
that required all students to salute the American flag during the recitation of
the Pledge of Allegiance.59 A state school expelled Jehovah’s Witnesses for
refusing to salute the flag on religious grounds.60 In Wooley, the State of New
Hampshire prosecuted a couple who covered the slogan on their license plates
that stated, “Live Free or Die.”61 Both Jehovah’s Witnesses, the couple
claimed the slogan’s message violated their religious beliefs.62
The Court recognized that both a flag salute and traveling with a particular
license plate represent symbolic messages, which can be persuasive methods of
communication.63 The Court did not address the religious motivations in either
case,64 but noted that the respective regulations required “an individual, as part

53. Id. at 108, 112.
54. Id. 113 (“The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms is indeed
as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down.” (citing
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) (other citations omitted)).
55. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 , 881–82 (1990),
superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 (1993)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as recognized in Gonzales v.
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006).
56. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
57. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
58. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
59. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 627–30.
60. Id. at 629–30.
61. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707–08.
62. Id.
63. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632 (finding that the flag salute is a “primitive but effective way of
communicating ideas”); accord Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (“Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with
a state measure which forces an individual, as part of his daily life—indeed constantly while his
automobile is in public view—to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological
point of view he finds unacceptable.”).
64. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (analyzing the issue in terms of “the right to speak freely and
the right to refrain from speaking” because they implicate “the broader concept of ‘individual
freedom of mind’” (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637)); Barnette, 319 U.S at 634–35 (noting that
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of his daily life . . . to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an
ideological point of view that he finds unacceptable” through such symbols.65
In both Barnette and Wooley, the Court held that the Bill of Rights prevents
government officials from forcing an individual to symbolically affirm a belief
contrary to his conscience—a holding compelled by the values protected under
the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.66
3. Hybrid Cases Involving Parental Right
Wisconsin v. Yoder is the only hybrid-claim case acknowledged by the Smith
Court, in which the Court invalidated a neutral, generally applicable law
because of parental rights.67 The Smith Court also cited to Prince v.
Massachusetts;68 however, in that case the Court did not find a successful
hybrid claim involving parental rights and consequently upheld a neutral,
generally applicable law as applied to the claimant, who professed religious
motivations.69
In Yoder, an Amish family sought to exempt its children from a state law
compelling secondary education because such education violated their way of
the issue did not turn on the religious motives of the appellees, but rather the Court’s decision
rested on whether or not the state had the power in the first place to make the salute a legal duty).
65. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713 (equating the flag-salute statute in Barnette to the license plate
statute in the present case); see also Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633 (“[Saluting the flag] requires the
individual to communicate by word and sign his acceptance of the political ideas it thus
bespeaks.”).
66. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641–42. Stanford Law Professor and
former Tenth Circuit Judge Michael McConnell, before criticizing Justice Felix Frankfurter’s
dissent in Barnette, explained the significance of free-exercise protection in accordance with the
holdings in Barnette and Wooley:
If government admits that God (whomever that may be) is sovereign, then it also
admits that its claims on the loyalty and obedience of the citizens is partial and
instrumental. Even the mighty democratic will of the people is, in principle,
subordinate to the commands of God, as heard and understood in the individual
conscience. In such a nation, with such a commitment, totalitarian tyranny is a
philosophical impossibility.
McConnell, supra note 3, at 1516.
67. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990),
superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 (1993)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as recognized in Gonzales v.
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006).
68. Id. at 879–80 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 171 (1944)). The Court
does not discuss Prince in the context of other hybrid situations, but rather discusses it in support
of its general prohibition against religious exemptions to laws of general applicability. Id.
However, by the Supreme Court’s own terms in Prince, a hybrid situation was in fact involved.
See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165 (“On one side is the obviously earnest claim for freedom of
conscience and religious practice. With it is allied the parent’s claim to authority in her own
household and in the rearing of her children.” (emphasis added)).
69. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165–67, 170.

2011]

Evaluating "Hybrid-Rights" Free-Exercise Claims

275

life as members of the Amish religion.70 The Court recognized that an
infringement on the “rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their
children. . . . combined with a free exercise claim” warranted strict scrutiny.71
Because the state law at issue in Yoder did not satisfy strict scrutiny, the Court
granted the Yoders an exemption to compulsory education.72
The Prince case, like Yoder, presented a hybrid claim involving free exercise
combined with the parental rights associated with raising children.73
Massachusetts labor laws prevented a mother from directing her children to
distribute religious literature in the streets.74 Although the Court recognized
the right of “parents to give [their children] religious training and to encourage
them in the practice of religious belief,”75 the Court concluded that legitimate
concerns regarding child health and public safety could justify a state’s
constraints on that parental right.76 Unlike Wisconsin’s relatively weak
child-welfare interest in Yoder, Massachusetts’s interest in prohibiting child
labor sufficiently outweighed the parental-rights hybrid claim.77 Accordingly,
the claim in Prince failed.78
C. Silence Speaks Volumes: CLS and a World Without Hybrid Claims
In CLS, The University of California, Hastings College of Law denied the
CLS student group official recognition because its statement of faith violated
70. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
71. See id. at 233. The Court did not explicitly call their review of Wisconsin’s
compulsory-education statute strict scrutiny. However, the Court does conclude that the analysis
requires more than rational-basis review. See id. at 221 (discussing Wisconsin’s argument that
“its interest in its system of compulsory education is so compelling”). Additionally, the Court
rejected the State’s argument because of the parent’s religious interests at stake in conjunction
with the State’s failure to show countervailing health and safety interests. Id. at 221, 230. A
compelling state interest is a key component of strict scrutiny analysis. See Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (holding, in accordance with
Sherbert, that when a state law in the context of unemployment benefits burdens religious free
exercise, the Court “subject[s] [the law] to strict scrutiny and could be justified only by proof by
the State of a compelling interest”).
72. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233–34. The Court recognized that the Amish produced “persuasive
evidence undermining the arguments the State . . . advanced to supports its claims in terms of the
welfare of the child and society as a whole.” Id. at 234. These considerations informed the
contrary result in Prince, a case similarly involving a parental-rights hybrid claim. See Prince,
321 U.S. at 166–67.
73. Prince, 321 U.S. at 165.
74. Id. at 161–62.
75. Id. at 165.
76. Id. at 166–67 (“[T]he state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and
authority in things affecting the child’s welfare; and that this includes, to some extent, matters of
conscience and religious conviction.”).
77. See id. at 166–67.
78. Id. at 170.
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the school’s nondiscrimination policy.79 When the Supreme Court considered
whether a public law school could require adherence to the policy as a
condition for official student-group recognition, the Court considered the
policy’s requirements and its implementation.80 The policy prevented student
groups from discriminating, inter alia, on the basis of religion in membership
and leadership selection.81
The law school admitted that although it refused to recognize CLS, a
religious group, the school’s nondiscrimination policy allowed other types of
groups “to select officers and members who were dedicated to a particular set
of ideals or beliefs.”82 The law school’s denial of recognition prohibited CLS
from accessing the University’s communication mediums and school
funding.83
Although the Supreme Court entertained CLS’s many First Amendment
claims,84 the Court quickly dismissed the free-exercise claim in a footnote,
citing to the rule in Smith that “the Free Exercise Clause does not inhibit
enforcement of otherwise valid regulations” of general application that
incidentally burden religious conduct.85 According to the Court, giving CLS a
free-exercise exemption from the law school’s policy would give it
“preferential, not equal treatment.”86 CLS did not raise the issue of Smith’s
hybrid-situations exception,87 and the Court did not mention it.88
79. CLS, 130B S. Ct. 2971, 2979–80 (2010). (“CLS’s bylaws, Hastings explained, did not
comply with the Nondiscrimination Policy because CLS barred students based on religion and
sexual orientation.”). For the purposes of this Comment, the CLS discussion will focus on the
“nondiscrimination policy” as written, rather than the “all comers” policy that informed the
majority opinion and had been adopted through the parties’ factual stipulation. See id. at 2984.
CLS was denied registered-student-organization status under the nondiscrimination
policy—only that denial, if anything, would implicate a hybrid claim. The majority evaluated the
claim under the “all comers” policy because of the prospective relief requested by CLS; therefore,
their concerns regarding the nondiscrimination policy are not implicated here. Id. at 2982 n.6.
80. Id. at 2979–80.
81. Id. at 2979.
82. Id. at 3003 (Alito, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 3002 (Alito, J., dissenting). These campus communicative avenues include
“posting messages on designated bulletin boards, sending mass e-mails to the student body,
distributing material through the Student Information Center, and participating in the annual
student organizations fair.” Id.
84. Id. at 2984–95.
85. Id. at 2995 n.27 (citing Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 878–882 (1990), superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 Stat.
1488, 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as
recognized in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424
(2006)).
86. Id.
87. Brief for Petitioner at 40–41, CLS,130B S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1371). CLS’s brief
arguably suggested a hybrid-rights claim when it recognized that the right to religious association
is “rooted in both the Free Exercise Clause and the Speech Clause.” See id. At a minimum,
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D. The Court’s Doubting Thomas89: Justice Souter’s Argument Against
Hybrid Rights
Justice Souter’s critique in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah attacked both the existence of hybrid rights and the jurisprudential
consequences of their recognition.90 His critique stands as the only elaboration
on hybrid rights from the Supreme Court since Smith.91
Justice Souter disagreed with the majority in Smith because of his view that
the purported hybrid cases were, in truth, pure free-exercise cases.92
Discussing Cantwell and Yoder, Justice Souter argued that “[n]either
opinion . . . leaves any doubt that ‘fundamental claims of religious freedom
[were] at stake.’”93 According to Justice Souter, the Cantwell Court separately
provided its free-speech analysis later in the opinion after its discussion of free
exercise.94 The free-speech claim in Cantwell thus referred to “an entirely
different issue” than the free-exercise claim.95
Justice Souter argued that the Smith Court placed undue significance on the
of role parental rights in Yoder.96 He considered the language in Yoder that
dismissed the standard of review under a parental-rights claim as
“inapplicable.”97 As characterized by Justice Souter, the Yoder Court required
that the state’s action “must be measured by a stricter test, the test developed

CLS’s cryptic reference to hybrid rights demonstrates how much the existence of the doctrine is
ignored and undeveloped by the Court. Cf. Brett G. Scharffs. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of
Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 37 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CASES 300, 304
(2010), available at www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/ChristianLegal.pdf (“One might have
thought that this case would have been a good place to test the concept of hybrid rights or to test
the limits of autonomy of religious groups.”).
88. CLS, 130B S. Ct. at 2995 n.27.
89. The term is a reference to Christ’s apostle Thomas, who refused to recognize Christ’s
resurrection unless Christ Himself provided him the proof. See John 20: 24–29.
90. See 508 U.S. 520, 566–67 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
91. The Court in City of Boerne v. Flores acknowledged hybrid rights in passing:
The only instances where a neutral, generally applicable law had failed to pass
constitutional muster, the Smith Court noted, were cases in which other constitutional
protections were at stake. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, for example, we invalidated
Wisconsin’s mandatory school-attendance law as applied to Amish parents who refused
on religious grounds to send their children to school. That case implicated not only the
right to the free exercise of religion but also the right of parents to control their
children’s education.
521 U.S. 507, 513–14 (1997) (citations omitted).
92. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 566 (Souter, J., concurring).
93. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)).
94. Id. at 567 n.4.
95. Id. at 567.
96. Id. at 566–67, 567 n.4.
97. Id. at 567 n.4 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233).
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under the Free Exercise Clause.”98 Considered along with other indicia,99 he
was not persuaded by the Smith Court’s characterization of Yoder as a
distinguishable hybrid situation.100
Justice Souter’s primary criticism of the hybrid-rights doctrine focused on
two central points.101 First, the Smith Court’s conception of a hybrid claim as
simply one that implicates a second constitutional right in conjunction with
free exercise would create an exception so vast that it swallows the rule.102 He
noted that “free speech and associational rights are certainly implicated in the
peyote ritual” at issue in Smith.103 Justice Souter reasoned that if the mere
presence of a companion constitutional claim defeats Smith’s general rule, then
Smith was a hybrid case and the rule that courts take from it does not
distinguish hybrid claims—it is consumed by them.104 Second, if a claimant
were exempt from a neutral law of general applicability in a so-called hybrid
claim under a different constitutional provision, then there would be no need to
include the free-exercise claim because the claim under the companion
provision would be adequate to achieve the same result.105 Therefore,
according to Justice Souter, the hybrid analysis is not only absent from the
relevant case law, but attempting to implement any analysis from Smith’s
parsing would be logically indefensible.106
E. Serving Many Masters: Circuits Wrestle with the Arguments
The disputed validity of hybrid rights within free-exercise jurisprudence
inspired a convoluted and increasingly skeptical circuit-court reception.107
98. Id. (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233). Justice Souter’s reference here is to the
substantial-burden test elaborated in Sherbert. See supra note 9.
99. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 567 n.4 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice
Souter noted, “the Yoder opinion makes clear that the case involves ‘the central values underlying
the Religion Clauses.’” Id. (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234). He also noted that the Yoders’ only
defense to their prosecution under the school-attendance law was a free-exercise claim, and the
Court only granted certiorari on a free-exercise claim. Id.
100. Id. at 566 (“Though Smith sought to distinguish the free-exercise cases in which the
Court mandated exemptions from secular laws of general application, I am not persuaded.”
(citations omitted)).
101. See id at 567.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143–44 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Several circuits have
stated that Smith mandates stricter scrutiny for hybrid situations than for a free exercise claim
standing alone, but, as far as we are able to tell, no circuit has yet actually applied strict scrutiny
based on this theory.”); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES, 1261–62 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing circuit disputes over the application of the hybrid
exception recognized in Smith).
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The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kissinger v. Board of Trustees of the Ohio
State University, College of Veterinary Medicine108 informed the other federal
circuits, including the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits, all of which viewed
Smith’s hybrid-rights discussion as dicta.109 In Kissinger, the Sixth Circuit
characterized the hybrid-rights doctrine as a theory that would strike down an
ordinance on free-exercise grounds “if it implicates other constitutional rights,”
but preserves the ordinance as constitutional if the ordinance only implicates
the Free Exercise Clause.110 The court considered this “completely illogical,”
arguing that Justice Souter’s critique strengthened this conclusion.111 Rather
than wrestle with the Court’s words, the Kissinger approach simply considers
Smith’s hybrid-rights language to be dicta until the Supreme Court further
108. 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding the hybrid-rights concept “completely
illogical”).
109. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 440 n.45 (9th Cir. 2008)
(implying that Smith’s hybrid-rights doctrine is dicta because it has been widely criticized and
“no court has ever allowed a plaintiff to bootstrap a free exercise claim in this manner”); Combs
v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 246–47 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (agreeing with the
Sixth Circuit that the Smith decision left the hybrid-rights analysis undefined and finding Smith’s
hybrid-rights language to be dicta until further guidance issues from the Supreme Court);
Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) (agreeing with the Sixth Circuit’s
Kissinger decision when declining to adopt the hybrid-rights approach contained in Smith’s dicta
because the court found “no good reason for the standard of review to vary simply with the
number of constitutional rights that the plaintiff asserts have been violated”); see also Warner v.
City of Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 1272, 1288 n.12 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (rejecting the plaintiffs’
argument for using strict scrutiny under Smith’s hybrid-rights theory because it is dicta and such
an analysis is otherwise untenable (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 567
(Souter, J. concurring))). In 1999, the Ninth Circuit attempted to employ a hybrid-rights analysis
requiring a “colorable” companion claim because, according to the court, Smith did not overrule
the so-called hybrid cases, rather it distinguished them and, therefore, they still stand as binding
precedent and cannot be ignored. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d
692, 704 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn and reh’g granted, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated
en banc as not ripe, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). However, the Ninth Circuit withdrew the
opinion sitting en banc and substituted a new opinion in 2000, which vacated the district court’s
decision and instructed it to dismiss the case on remand as not ripe; therefore, the court did not
address the issue of hybrid rights. See Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1142. Before the court withdrew the
initial Thomas opinion, another Ninth Circuit opinion, Miller v. Reed, relied upon Thomas’s
discussion of hybrid rights to reject the claimant’s argument that his claim was a hybrid. See 176
F.3d 1202, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Thomas, 165 F.3d at 703, 707). The court reasoned
that a hybrid-rights claim requires more than the combination of an “utterly meritless”
constitutional claim; however, the court did not further discuss the issue beyond its refusal to
acknowledge the claim as hybrid. Id. In 2004, the Ninth Circuit, this time relying on Miller,
concluded that the claimant failed to assert a hybrid-rights claim because the claimant’s
companion constitutional claims were not “colorable.” San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of
Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2004). However, the Ninth Circuit’s most recent
decisions refuse to acknowledge the hybrid-rights doctrine. See Ass’n of Christian Sch. Int’l v.
Stearns, 362 F. App’x 640, 646 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Jacobs, 526 F.3d at 440 n.45).
110. 5 F.3d at 180 & n.1.
111. Id. at 180 n.1.
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elaborates on the issue.112 The Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits took a step
back from the Sixth Circuit’s skepticism and acknowledged the possibility of
hybrid claims; however, these circuits ultimately shied away from attempting
to define an evaluative standard.113
In contrast, the First Circuit suggested that a hybrid-rights claim could be
successful if a claimant argued a free-exercise claim in conjunction with an
independently protected companion constitutional claim—a constitutional
claim, other than free exercise, which can be viably raised from the facts.114
The D.C. Circuit also seems to have embraced the independently protected
approach,115 but has only used the approach in dicta.116 Opinions from these
circuits do not clearly demonstrate whether an independently protected claim is
actually required with a free-exercise claim for a hybrid challenge. The First
Circuit will likely not clarify the issue because it recently disputed the
assertion that it had ever actually considered the hybrid-rights theory.117
112. Id. at 180; accord Jacobs, 526 F.3d at 440 n.45; Combs, 540 F. 3d at 247; Leebaert, 332
F.3d at 144.
113. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 765 (7th Cir.
2003) (recognizing the ability to bring a hybrid free-exercise claim entitled to heightened scrutiny
but finding that the appellants’ companion claims lacked the merit necessary to survive a motion
for summary judgment; therefore, the court concluded that the appellants had failed to establish a
hybrid claim); Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 473 (8th Cir. 1991)
(accepting Smith’s acknowledgement of hybrid-rights claims but remanding the case to determine
whether the plaintiff’s facts presented such a claim); Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939
F.2d 1207, 1209–16 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that the court’s holding is consistent with a hybridclaim exception from the general rule in Smith because this case implicated “religion-plusspeech”—the plaintiff was forced to state an oath or affirmation that she argued violated her
freedom of speech and religion), aff’d on reh’g, 959 F.2d 1283, 1288–89 (5th Cir. 1991).
114. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy, & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding
no hybrid-rights claim for parents alleging interference with their parental right because those
allegations “do not state a privacy or substantive due process claim” and, therefore, “[t]heir free
exercise challenge is . . . not conjoined with an independently protected constitutional
protection”), overruled in part by Martinez v. Hongyi CUI, 608 F.3d 54, 63–64 (1st Cir. 2010).
115. See, e.g., Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that a
successful hybrid-rights argument requires a “violat[ion]” of the Free Exercise Clause and having
a “viable” claim under another constitutional clause). The D.C. Circuit noted here that a lacking
free-exercise claim would not be saved by an equally lacking free-speech claim. See id. (“[T]he
combination of two untenable claims [does not equal] a tenable one.”).
116. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Here, the court
noted that it could find a free-exercise violation even it its actual holding is mistaken because the
case involved a hybrid claim between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, and
“EEOC’s attempt to enforce Title VII [against Catholic University] would both burden Catholic
University’s right of free exercise and excessively entangle the Government in religion.” Id. The
actual holding was based on the court’s recognition that Catholic University fell under the
ministerial exception from Title VII. Id.
117. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 97, 98 & n.9 (1st Cir. 2008) (concluding that Brown
neither settled the question whether “independently viable constitutional claim[s] are required to
bring a successful hybrid-rights claim, nor did it definitively establish that Smith created a new
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Ultimately, neither the D.C. Circuit nor the First Circuit has decided a case on
hybrid grounds.118
The Tenth Circuit stands alone with an articulated, explicit analytical
standard for hybrid claims.119 Seeking to harmonize Justice Souter’s critiques
with Smith’s explication,120 the Tenth Circuit has required that “the
hybrid-rights claimant . . . show that the companion constitutional claim is
Rather than proving the independent viability of the
‘colorable.’”121
companion claim, the “colorable claim” approach simply requires the
companion claim have “a fair probability or likelihood, but not a certitude, of
success on the merits.”122 The fact-specific nature of this case-by-case
approach inhibits the articulation of a clear rule.123 Even with the standard, the
Tenth Circuit has yet to decide a case on the grounds of a hybrid-rights
claim.124
II. ANALYZING THE ARGUMENTS, ARTICULATING A STANDARD
The conflicting views of the Smith Court and Justice Souter on hybrid rights,
along with the attempts of lower courts to weigh and apply those divergent
views, raise two essential questions: First, do Smith and its cited precedent
recognize hybrid-rights claims involving free exercise? If so, then second,
does free-exercise precedent provide an analytical standard?

category of hybrid claims in the first place). In Parker v. Hurley, the First Circuit declined to
involve itself in the debate over the interpretation of Smith’s hybrid-rights doctrine. Id. at 98. For
an extensive analysis of the independently viable companion claim approach, see Ryan M. Akers,
Begging the High Court for Clarification: Hybrid Rights Under Employment Division v. Smith,
17 REGENT U. L. REV. 77, 94–95, 99 (2004/2005).
118. Cf. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 88 (Cal. 2004)
(“We are aware of no decision in which a federal court has actually relied solely on the hybrid
rights theory to justify applying strict scrutiny to a free exercise claim [as of the date of this
decision, March 1, 2009].”).
119. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1295–97 (10th Cir. 2004); see also,
Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998) (declining to
find a hybrid claim in the present case, but acknowledging that the hybrid-rights analysis requires
at least a “colorable” claim).
120. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1295, 1296 & n.18 (“Our [colorable claim] approach strikes a
middle ground between the two extremes of painting hybrid-rights claims too generously and
construing them too narrowly.”).
121. See id. at 1296–97. The Tenth Circuit’s “colorable claim” approach is similar to the
approach taken by the Ninth Circuit before it decided Jacobs v. Clark County School District, 526
F.3d 419 (9th Cir. 2008), in 2008. See supra note 111.
122. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1297.
123. See id.
124. Cf. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 88 (Cal. 2004).
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A. Hybrid Rights Exist Within Free-Exercise Precedent
Before the Ninth Circuit abandoned the colorable-claim approach,125 it
recognized the unavoidable problem with rejecting Smith’s hybrid-rights
theory in its withdrawn opinion in Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Commission: “Smith did not overrule Cantwell, Murdock, Follett, and Yoder; it
distinguished them.”126 Each of these cases involved claims that required an
exemption from a neutral law of general applicability.127 If the hybrid-rights
exception does not exist, then the cases cited in Smith are irreconcilable with
the Court’s decision because they mandate religious-based exemptions from
generally applicable laws—a view of free exercise that Smith explicitly
rejected.128 Failing to distinguish these cases from the general principle
announced in Smith that there can be no religious exemptions for neutral,
generally applicable laws129 would contradict Smith’s holding, rendering it
meaningless.130
Denying or ignoring hybrid precedent fails to appreciate the vast change that
Smith brought to free-exercise law, and the relief hybrid-rights theory
preserves in light of that change.131 The Smith rule restricted
free-exercise-based exemptions, drastically reducing plaintiffs seeking to
vindicate their free-exercise rights in litigation.132 Without overruling hybrid
cases and by applying them to petitioners’ claim, Smith’s analysis strongly
suggests that hybrid-rights theory is to ensure the viability of religious-based
exemptions as a remedy to free-exercise violations that are not caught by
Smith’s rule, but nevertheless represent protected aspects of the Constitution’s

125. See supra note 111.
126. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 704 (9th Cir. 1999),
withdrawn and reh’g granted, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated en banc as not ripe, 220
F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
127. Id.
128. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that the Smith Court called the hybrid cases “not true
free-exercise cases” because “the Court mandated exemptions from secular laws of general
application” (citing Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–85
(1990), superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488
(1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as recognized in
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006))).
129. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
130. See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 704.
131. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 157–64 (2008) (discussing the sea change Smith brought to
free-exercise jurisprudence and its subsequent impact on legislation and case law).
132. Id. Amy Adamczyk, John Wybraniec & Roger Finke, Religious Regulation and the
Courts: Documenting the Effects of Smith and RFRA, 46 J. CHURCH & ST. 237, 240–42, 25
(2004).
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free-exercise guarantee.133 Furthermore, legal scholars and members of
Congress considered the Court’s confirmation of hybrid rights in Smith bona
fide.134 Some scholars and courts might dismiss hybrid-rights theory under the
argument that the Court in Smith created a distinction merely to reason around
precedent that would have otherwise mandated an undesired result.135 Yet
lower court judges “charged with resolving a specific controversy . . . lack the
luxury that the ivory tower provides.”136 The role of these courts is not to right
the potential wrongs of Supreme Court case law, but “to make sense of a
confusing doctrinal situation—to make the pieces fit.”137 By ignoring hybrid
precedent, which the Supreme Court expressly preserved in Smith, circuit
courts treat controlling law with improper casualness138 and diminish the
import of free-exercise exemptions, especially given Smith’s already limited
role for such exemptions.139
B. Searching for a Standard in Smith
In addition to serving as the proverbial display case for hybrid rights, the
decision in Smith also provides the blueprints for the hybrid-rights analysis.
The Court’s description of successful hybrid precedent highlights the contours
133. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82. The Court’s analysis of the fired employees’ claim
suggests that its non-hybrid status was dispositive:
The present case does not present such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim
unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right. Respondents urge us to
hold, quite simply, that when otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by
religious convictions, not only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from
governmental regulation. We have never held that, and decline to do so now.
Id. at 882.
134. See, e.g., Congress’ Constitutional Role in Protecting Religious Liberty: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 68–69 (1997) (statement of Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School) (responding to Senator
Edward Kennedy’s questions regarding ways in which Congress can legislate to protect hybrid
rights). Professor Paulsen offered a suggestion considered by other testifying experts:
My suggestion is to consider very carefully, and to reproduce in the form of statutory
language, all of the situations of hybrid rights already identified by the Supreme Court
in the Smith case, plus others that reasonably can be inferred from the Court’s language
and description of the principle, and to vigorously enforce those Free Exercise rights.
Id. at 69.
135. See, e.g., supra note 12.
136. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 704 n.8 (9th Cir. 1999),
withdrawn and reh’g granted, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated en banc as not ripe, 220
F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990),
superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 (1993)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as recognized in Gonzales v.
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006).
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of the doctrine.140 First, a free-exercise claim can join a companion
constitutional claim pertaining to a communicative activity (free speech, free
press, and perhaps association) or a parental right.141 The Court’s language in
Smith leaves the door open for potential non-communicative and non-parental
companion claims, but Smith’s reasoning may limit companion claims to those
two varieties.142 Second, a communicative activity serving as a companion
claim must be connected to “the communication of religious beliefs,” and a
parental right must be connected to “the raising of one’s children in those
beliefs.”143 This nexus between the free-exercise claim and the companion
claim allows the analysis to “specifically advert to the non-free exercise
principle involved”144 from the free-exercise claim.145 The Court does not
explicitly address whether the non-free-exercise principle must be an
independently protected companion claim or simply a colorable-enough
violation of a constitutional protection.146 However, its language does suggest
140. See id. at 881–82.
141. See id. at 881.
142. The Court lists communicative and parental-rights claims as examples of companion
claims, but the language “in conjunction with other constitutional protections such as” suggests
that the Court may treat other constitutional claims similarly. Id. at 881 (emphasis added). In
fact, the D.C. Circuit’s treatment of Catholic University’s hybrid claim involving the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses indicates the plausibility of reading Smith’s hybrid
analysis beyond just communicative and parental rights. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83
F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The same could be said under the colorable-claim approach.
See, e.g., Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1999) (refusing to find a hybrid-rights
claim implicating both interstate travel and free exercise because the interstate-travel claim was
“utterly meritless”). However, Smith confined its speculation of other hybrid claims to First
Amendment communicative concerns. 494 U.S. at 882 (“And it is easy to envision a case in
which a challenge on freedom of association grounds would likely be reinforced by Free Exercise
Clause concerns.” (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycess, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984))). The Court
resolved that the facts did not fit a hybrid mold because the free-exercise claim was unconnected
to “any communicative activity or parental right.” Id.
143. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
144. See id. at 881 n.1.
145. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513–14 (1997) (construing Smith’s reference to
hybrid rights as one where the free-exercise claim has to rely on another constitutional claim at
stake).
146. However, Smith’s citation to hybrid cases decided “exclusively” upon the companion
claim cuts against the colorable-claim approach because the cited cases clearly involved more
than a colorable claim. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713–15 (1977); W. Va. Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). Yet Smith’s language creates some ambiguity over
the requirements of the companion claim because the cited hybrid precedents are themselves
ambiguous. Although no hybrid precedent involved an explicitly “colorable” companion claim,
Cantwell involved an apparently viable speech claim subject to the “clear and present danger” test
under free-speech doctrine. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940). On the other
hand, the Court in Yoder dismissed the viability of the parental-rights claim in lieu of the
free-exercise claim. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–19 (1972). For a detailed discussion
of the implications involved with accepting the colorable-claim approach to hybrid claims on
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that the companion claim must at least plausibly exist.147 Additionally, mere
religious belief, or the centrality of the implicated religious activity to one’s
religious beliefs, is not a part of the companion claim.148
C. Smith’s Cited Precedent Refines the Analysis
Smith divided hybrid precedent into three variations: communicative
activities, parental rights, and cases in which the decisions exclusively rely on
another constitutional right but involve religious freedom.149 These three
categories possess one commonality that functions both as a guidepost and a
limit to the hybrid analysis—all successful hybrid cases decided in the
Supreme Court challenged laws requiring affirmative compulsion “under threat
of criminal sanction to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental
tenets of [the claimant’s] religious beliefs.”150 As suggested in Mundock and
Cantwell, the affirmative compulsion in the communicative context must rise
to the level of censorship.151 In Barnette and Wooley, cases that exclusively
relied on free-speech grounds, this compulsion took the form of state-imposed
symbolism.152
Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause doctrine, see Note, The Best of a Bad Lot:
Compromise and Hybrid Religious Exemptions, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1494, 1506–07 (2010).
147. Cf. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 n.1. The Court would not focus its situation specifically on
the free-exercise principle as the claim presented was implausible. See id.
148. See id. at 886–87 (“It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the ‘centrality’ of
religious beliefs before applying a ‘compelling interest’ test in the free exercise field, than it
would be for them to determine the ‘importance’ of ideas before applying the ‘compelling
interest’ test in the free speech field. What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to
contradict a believer’s assertion that a particular act is ‘central’ to his personal faith?”).
149. Id. at 881–82.
150. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 (exempting Amish claimants from compulsory school
attendance because mandating secondary education interfered with the religious development of
Amish children); accord Wooley, 430 U.S. at 706, 717 (holding that New Hampshire was
prohibited from enforcing criminal sanctions against Jehovah’s Witnesses who covered the state
motto on their license plates because the motto was repugnant to their religious beliefs); Barnette,
319 U.S. at 624, 626–29 (exempting Jehovah Witnesses from a public school resolution that
compelled a flag salute and pledge by threatening prosecution of the child and parents for
insubordination, when such consents were fundamentally at odds with their religious beliefs);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 107–08, 113 (1943) (invalidating the enforcement of a
license tax on the solicitation of orders for goods as applied to Jehovah’s Witnesses distributing
religious literature because the tax effectively censured their free exercise); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at
305 (invalidating the enforcement of criminal sanctions against Jehovah’s Witnesses for failure to
comply with a mandatory licensing system for religious solicitation because the system permitted
censorship of religion as the means of determining its “right to survive”).
151. See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 113 (“The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of
these freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of censorship . . . .”); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 305
(“Such a censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive is a denial of
liberty protected by the First Amendment . . . .”).
152. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632.
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The parental-rights category contains analogous qualifications for the
affirmative compulsion required to garner the hybrid exemption. Importantly,
the Yoder case clarified that its holding “in no degree depends on the assertion
of the religious interest of the child . . . it is [the parents’] right of free exercise,
not that of their children” at issue because the State was prosecuting the
parents, not the child.153 The Court’s focus on the rights of the parents in
Yoder reveals the nature of the improper state infringement in that case—the
state’s compulsory policy “prevented these Amish parents from making
fundamental decisions regarding their children’s religious upbringing and
effectively overrode their ability to pass their religion on to their children.”154
Therefore, the parental right implicated in a successful hybrid case is narrowed
to instances where the state’s affirmative compulsion renders it nearly
impossible for parents to guide the religious future of their children.155
The Prince case further narrowed the scope of affirmative-compulsion
hybrid-rights exemption when the Court noted that parental rights are limited
to some extent by the state’s proffered interests in child health and public
safety.156 Thus, the Court will not grant an exemption for a parental-rights
free-exercise claim when the interests of the state in the child’s health and the
public welfare outweigh those rights.157
Both the communicative-activity and parental-rights categories of hybrid
precedent reveal the significance of raising a companion claim with a
free-exercise claim—but for the free-exercise implication, the state’s
affirmative compulsion could be constitutional.158 In the communicative
153. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230–31.
154. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 99–100 (1st Cir. 2008) (second emphasis added). This
quotation accurately reflects the Court’s discussion in Yoder of the fundamental right that parents
possess, including the interest of the parents “to guide the religious future and education of their
children.” See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232. The Court looked to Pierce v. Society of Sisters for
support, which accorindg to the Yoder Court acknowledged the fundamental right and duty of
parents “to recognize and prepare [their child] … for additional obligations.” Id. at 232–33
(quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)). The Court interpreted these
“additional obligations” as necessarily including the teaching of “moral standards, religious
beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.” Id. at 233.
155. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219; see supra text accompanying notes 155–56.
156. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (“[A parent] cannot claim
freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds.
The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child
to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.” (footnote omitted)).
157. See id.
158. Cf. Yoder 406 U.S. at 215 (“[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”). The cases
cited to in Smith as decided exclusively on other grounds are not relevant here because their
resolution did not require the analysis of a religious free-exercise claim in conjunction with any
companion claim. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882
(1990) (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
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context, the Murdock Court noted that religious claimants require more
protection from a tax on pamphleteering than secular, commercial speech
because of the censorship on religious speech.159 A secular claimant would not
necessarily receive the same level of protection as that provided to a religious
claimant in such a case.160 In the parental-rights context, a parent’s claim
would not inhibit reasonable regulation if the parent based his or her objection
on “purely secular considerations.”161
State interests may still intercede in the context of health and public safety to
temper the plus factor that the Free Exercise Clause provides.162 With this
analysis, the hybrid-rights doctrine recognizes a significant exception to
Smith’s general free-exercise rule because the claimant’s free-exercise interest
in the companion activity “saves” the claimant from what could otherwise be a
constitutional state regulation of the companion activity.163

U.S. 624 (1943)), superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 Stat. 1488,
1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as recognized in
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006).
159. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110–12 (1943).
160. Id. at 110–11. Although it is true that “the pamphlets of Thomas Paine were not
distributed free of charge,” and are thus afforded a similar level of protection as religious
publications, this language simply proves that political speech could also serve as a “plus factor,”
much like religion did in Murdock. See id. However, this does not dispute that religion did
provide the Murdock claimant a plus that, as the Court says, “retailers or wholesalers of books”
would not have. See id. Therefore, the opinion’s language reveals that a speech claim would
necessarily give a claimant the same type of “plus” factor that religion would always give a
claimant. Id. at 111–12.
161. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
162. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165–67 (1944).
163. See supra Parts II.A–B. Although the Court has yet to entertain a hybrid claim
involving a sect, such as secular humanism, that does not profess a belief in the existence of God,
the sole case on point fell into the uncontroversial territory of the free-exercise prohibition against
compelled belief. See Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 & n.11 (1961) (reaffirming that the
Free Exercise Clause prohibits states and the federal government from either “constitutionally
forc[ing] a person” to believe or disbelieve a religion or aiding God-believing religions against
other religions, such as secular humanism). As the Court implied that secular humanism was a
religion, the hybrid-rights exception would likely protect it even though secular humanism rejects
traditional religious concepts. See id. at 495 n.11. The potential for this expansion of the
exception is not likely to compromise the exception’s limits because the hybrid analysis evaluates
the extent to which a state interferes with a constitutionally protected activity implicated by the
claimant’s free exercise, rather than the content of the particular religious belief. See supra Part
II.C.

288

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:265

D. The Analytical Sequence for Hybrid Rights
Smith’s language and hybrid-rights precedent provide a test for hybrid rights
that is divided into three “lines of cases” with common threshold
requirements.164
1. Threshold Requirements
As a threshold matter, a successful hybrid-rights claim must possess either
an independently viable constitutional claim related to a communicative
activity protected by the First Amendment or a constitutionally recognized
parental right.165 Either companion claim must possess a certain nexus with the
free-exercise claim that pivots the analysis toward the companion claim.166
The regulated activity must implicate both the free-exercise claim and the
companion claim in a way that accords with the required nexus for a
communicative or parental-rights claim.167 The state’s regulation must place
an affirmative burden on free exercise that compels the claimant to perform
some act.168 Assuming satisfaction of the threshold determinations, the
analysis then branches off into one of the three categories identified in
Smith.169
2. Category 1: Communicative-Activity Hybrid Cases
In the communicative context, a free-exercise claim links with
communicative claims that evoke religious beliefs.170 This category requires
the imposition of an affirmative obligation on a communicative act involving
religious beliefs that exacts a burden on their free exercise.171 Significant
interference with the ability to communicate religious beliefs is necessary to
reach the required level of burdening.172 Smith emphasizes that this part of the
164. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82, 881 n.1
(1990), superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488
(1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as recognized in
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006).
165. See Part II.B. Smith does not dismiss the possibility of non-communicative or nonparental companion claims in hybrid rights, nor does Smith dismiss companion claims that are
less than independently viable. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. However, Supreme
Court precedent involved an independently protected claim, which certainly avoids the possibility
that the hybrid analysis would advert to a claim that does not exist. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
166. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882; supra notes 146–47 and accompanying test.
167. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
168. See supra Part II.C.
169. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
170. See id. at 881 n.1.
171. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
172. This is consistent with the conventional standard for a successful claim asserting the
violation of a fundamental constitutional right. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391 (1978)
(requiring “substantial interference” with a fundamental constitutional right to successfully
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hybrid exception protects the ability to communicate information about
religion, not solely the ability to communicate.173 If the imposition is akin to
censorship, the combination of the religious implication with the
communicative activity exempts the claimant from the law.174
3. Category 2: Cases Exclusive to Free Speech
If in satisfying the threshold requirements, the state law requires an
affirmative compulsion from the claimant in the form of a symbolic utterance
that implies acceptance of an ideology as belief,175 then this communicative
case is resolvable exclusively on free speech grounds and falls outside the
scope of the hybrid analysis.176
4. Category 3: Parental-Rights Cases
When a state law implicates parental rights and free exercise, the
free-exercise claim connects with the parental-rights claim if the regulated
activity involves child rearing in religion.177 However, the reasoning in Yoder
does not allow a religious claimant to withhold children from a compulsory
activity simply because the parent’s religion conflicts with the law.178 Rather,
the compelled act must override the parents’ right to pass their religious beliefs
and practice on to their children.179 However, as both Prince and Yoder make
clear, legitimate state interests in child health and public safety can override
parental interests even if the state regulation requires a compulsory act.180 If
litigate the claim). This is not to be confused with an evaluation of the extent to which the
communicative conduct is central to the practitioner’s religion. Smith rejects this form of analysis
emanating from Sherbert v. Verner. See supra note 8.
173. See supra note 147.
174. See Part I (discussing Murdock and Cantwell).
175. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 705 (1977) (holding that compelling
drivers to leave the state motto uncovered on their vehicle license plate is constitutionally
impermissible); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 624, 642 (1943) (concluding that
state compulsion of school children to salute the flag is constitutionally impermissible).
176. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (explaining that although both Wooley and Barnette involved
religious activity, they were decided purely on free-speech grounds (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at
713; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642)).
177. See supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text.
178. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972) (concluding that a mere religious
objection does not allow “every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which
society as a whole has important interests”).
179. See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 99–100 (1st Cir. 2008) ([C]ompulsory
attendance at any school—whether public, private, or home-based—prevented these Amish
parents from making fundamental decisions regarding their children’s religious upbringing and
effectively overrode their ability to pass their religion on to their children as their faith required.”
(citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233–35)).
180. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234 (determining that Wisconsin’s proffered interest in child
health and welfare through compulsory education could not trump the Yoders’ right to pass
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the state’s has no interest or its interest is not compelling, the analysis ends in
favor of the parents.181
III. COMMENTARY ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF APPLYING HYBRID RIGHTS
A. CLS Shows the Peril of Free Exercise Without Hybrid Rights
The CLS decision demonstrates both the significance of ignoring hybrid
claims and the effect of such claims.182 If the Court had considered the hybrid
standard, then it never could have relegated CLS’s free-exercise argument to
one footnote.183 In fact, the proposed standard could have provided an avenue
for CLS’s success under a hybrid theory considering the nondiscrimination
policy.
CLS would have had to first demonstrate a plausible companion
constitutional claim—either a communicative activity or parental right
implicated with their free-exercise claim.184 The CLS majority correctly
recognized the communicative activity of “expressive association” within the
case facts.185 Because “expressive association in this case is ‘the functional
equivalent of speech itself,’”186 a viable companion, communicative claim
existed, provided that CLS had an implicated free-exercise interest with the
requisite nexus to its communicative claim.187 The communicative activity at
issue pertained to the communication of religious beliefs through CLS’s
advocacy of its statement of faith. The law school required that CLS open its
doors to all students regardless of religious beliefs to gain recognized
Such a requirement is
organization status and university benefits.188
religion on to their children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (noting that a
parent cannot claim freedom from a compulsory act such as child vaccination due to child health
and public safety concerns); see also Prince, 321 U.S. at 168–69 (holding that the state interests
in child health and safety in preventing certain forms of child labor superseded a parental interest
in passing religion on to children).
181. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 (“[I]n order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance
beyond the eighth grade against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of a
legitimate religious belief, it must appear either that the State does not deny the free exercise of
religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to
override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.”).
182. CLS, 130B S. Ct. 2971, 2995 n.27 (2010).
183. See id.
184. See supra Part II.B.
185. CLS, 130B S. Ct. at 2985.
186. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 35, CLS, 130B S. Ct. at 2985 (No. 08-1371)).
187. See supra Part II.B; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997)
(describing Smith as holding that “a neutral, generally applicable law . . . fail[s] to pass
constitutional muster” when a free-exercise claim—in addition to another constitutional claim—is
brought).
188. CLS, 130B S. Ct. at 2950. The use of the law school’s communication avenues is
limited to recognized student organizations only. Id. at 2979. That the law school denied CLS
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tantamount to an affirmative compulsion because CLS would be forced to set
aside its statement of faith and would no longer be able to advocate its
religious beliefs effectively.189
If CLS had met the hybrid threshold requirements, then analysis would have
adverted to the non-free-exercise principle190—CLS’s communicative
companion claim.191 Under its nondiscrimination policy,192 the law school
prohibited CLS, as an official student group, from denying membership or
leadership roles to those who did not adhere to its statement of faith.193 The
law school’s denial of official statutes, and the consequent denial of access to
the schools’ communicative forums, implicates relatively straightforward
viewpoint discrimination because it came while granting political, social, and
cultural groups official status even though they deny similar statuses to
students based on ideological beliefs.194

this status because its statement of faith did not conform with the nondiscrimination policy
implicates the concerns that those avenues would be used to communicate the beliefs contained in
the statement of Smith. The statement of faith requires, among other things, adherence to
Christian teachings regarding One God in Three Persons, accepting Jesus Christ as humanity’s
savior, and the active presence of the Holy Spirit in one’s life. Id. at 2980 n.3
189. Id. at 2980–81. Had a hybrid-rights argument been considered, CLS would likely have
had to address why the interference on its free exercise still rose to the same level as the hybrid
cases Smith recognized, even though no apparent threat of criminal sanctions existed. CLS could
plausibly respond that the focus of the hybrid analysis here is on the level of imposition on its
exercise and whether it rises to affirmative compulsion—not whether the State choose to classify
that imposition as criminal. The hypothetical argument above proceeds on CLS reasoning in this
fashion.
190. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 n.1 (1990),
superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 (1993)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as recognized in Gonzales v.
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006).
191. The hybrid analysis does not resolve the dispute over whether a companion claim must
be independently protected by the Constitution or simply raise a colorable violation. See supra
Part II.B. However, a hybrid-rights claimant would be wise to analyze a companion claim under
the higher standard because an independently protected claim is certainly colorable, but the
opposite is not necessarily true.
192. See supra note 79 (discussing why the nondiscrimination policy is considered in this
Comment rather than the “all comers” policy).
193. CLS, 130B S. Ct. at 2980.
194. See id. at 3010 (Alito, J., dissenting). The First Amendment’s opposition to viewpoint
discrimination is considered a “bedrock principle” by the Supreme Court. See Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is
that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” (citations omitted)). As Justice Samuel Alito, Jr. noted for
the dissent, the Court did not try to defend the law school’s nondiscrimination policy as
constitutional because any attempt to do so would have failed. See CLS, 130B S. Ct. at 3010.
The language of the nondicrimination policy demonstrates the law school’s intent to disfavor
religious groups specifically, while amounting to “patent viewpoint discrimination.” See id.
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With the companion claim satisfied, the Court could have then determined
the particular what category of hybrid case at issue. Given the independent
viability of CLS’s speech claim,195 the case presents an analytical analogy to
communicative category cases, such as Cantwell and Murdock.196
Here, CLS’s hybrid claim analogizes comfortably to the claim at issue in
Murdock.197 The law school’s denial of communicative forums to CLS
because its statement of faith required those that advance it actually share it
significantly interfered with an “age old type of evangelism”—advertising
religious events and advocating its religious belief.198 Denying CLS access to
communicative avenues made available to other groups is arguably a more
potent example of censorship than experienced by the claimants in Murdock, in
which Pennsylvania simply taxed their use of communicative avenues.199
After satisfying a prima-facie hybrid analysis, it is plausible CLS could have
prevailed on these facts.200
B. The Hybrid Standard: Resolving Ambiguity, Critiques
The hybrid analysis detailed above clarifies the utility of the hybrid
precedent displayed in Smith. Its application could robustly reinvigorate
free-exercise jurisprudence for victims of subtle religious discrimination.201

195. See supra Part II.D.I (discussing independent-viability claims).
196. See supra Part II.D.2. However, Justice Alito’s dissent permits the inference that CLS’s
expressive-association claim—unconstitutional compulsion to associate with others with whom
they disagree—more closely aligns with claims that can be decided upon those grounds alone,
apart from the free-exercise interest as in Barnette and Wooley. See CLS, 130B S. Ct. at 3012
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“As our cases have recognized, the right of expressive association permits
a group to exclude an applicant for membership only if the admission of that person would
‘affec[t] in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000)); supra,
Parts I.B.2, II.D.3.
197. See supra Part II.D.2.
198. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110 (1943) (“[S]preading one’s religious
beliefs or preaching the Gospel through distribution of religious literature and through personal
visitations is an age-old type of evangelism with as high a claim to constitutional protection as the
more orthodox types.”).
199. Compare CLS, 130B S. Ct. at 3008 (noting the CLS was prevented from using campus
facilities with few exceptions, and from accessing the school’s communication avenues), with
Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106 (describing the state law at issue, which required paying a tax to canvas
or solicit).
200. Cf. Scharffs, supra note 89, at 304 (“One might have thought that this case would have
been a good place to test the concept of hybrid rights or to test the limits of autonomy of religious
groups.”).
201. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1387–92 (6th
ed. 2000) (discussing the decrease in free-exercise relief post-Smith due to the lack of
strict-scrutiny protection for plaintiffs).
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Importantly, the standard provides a response to Justice Souter’s prominent
two-pronged critique.202
Unlike the case-by-case colorable-claim theory, developed to reconcile
Smith’s critics with Smith’s language,203 this standard strives to provide the
missing analysis through the hybrid precedent confirmed in Smith.204 Having
an evaluative standard gives circuit courts appropriate guidance through
binding, precedential case law.205 The recognition of hybrid rights and their
evaluative standard would bolster efforts by the circuits to protect those hybrid
rights while awaiting a doctrine from the Supreme Court for evaluating the
claims.206
During the intervening time, religious-liberty plaintiffs should work to expel
the ambiguity remaining within the standard. Although some precedential
cases successfully invoking hybrid rights have suggested a requirement that the
state demonstrate an interest rising above a rational basis,207 the Court should
make it clear that hybrid scrutiny is indeed strict scrutiny, rather than a
variation of intermediate scrutiny.208 Additionally, the sufficiency of a
colorable companion claim to trigger the hybrid analysis209 and the limitation
of companion claims to communicative activities and parental rights, are issues
left undetermined in successful hybrid precedent.210 The former issue is
consequential to the characterization of a potential hybrid case, as CLS

202. See supra Part I.D.
203. See, e.g., Santoli, supra note 23, at 669 (“[T]he ‘colorable claim’ theory to the hybrid
rights exception is best suited to weigh the companion claim.”); Tuttle, supra note 23, at 722
(“[T]he colorable showing approach is needed to clear up the ambiguity surrounding the hybrid
rights exception.”).
204. See supra Parts II.B–D.
205. See Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (1998) (noting that
“this case illustrates the difficulty of applying the Smith exception” and expressing uncertainty
over what the “exception” requires other than, at least, a colorable claim).
206. See supra Part I.E.
207. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (“[W]hen the interests of
parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more
than merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State’ is
required to sustain the validity of the State’s requirement under the First Amendment.”).
208. Cf. Rodney A. Smolla, The Free Exercise of Religion After the Fall: The Case for
Intermediate Scrutiny, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 925, 930 (1998) (explaining that Smith stated
hybrid claims are to be evaluated using strict scrutiny, but noting that the Supreme Court failed to
explain its rationale for using this test).
209. See supra note 148.
210. See supra note 148 and accompanying text; see also William L. Esser IV, Note,
Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus or Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211, 238 (1998) (noting that judicial treatment of Smith’s ambiguous
language is inconclusive but the courts that have addressed this issue tend to limit the scope of
potential companion claims). For an elaboration on the variety of claims brought as hybrids, see
Esser, supra, at 240–42.
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demonstrates.211 Religious-liberty plaintiffs would be wise to employ the
hybrid-standard framework outlined above in litigation to refine these
undetermined aspects of the hybrid analysis in the circuit courts before the
Supreme Court’s ultimate resolution.
Despite its interstices, the standard refutes Justice Souter’s influential
criticisms of hybrid rights. As noted above, the circuit courts that have
rejected hybrid rights as dicta rely on Justice Souter’s concurrence.212
However, the merits of Smith’s hybrid-rights exception are not the issue for
circuits contending with hybrid claims so long as Smith remains good law, no
matter the merits of Justice Souter’s general critiques of the decision. The
issue for courts contending with hybrid claims is what standard to apply to
such claims.213
Justice Souter first argued that a proper understanding of the hybrid-rights
exception would in theory be “so vast as to swallow the Smith rule.”214 Yet,
the hybrid analysis articulated above demonstrates the rarity of successful
hybrid claims.215 Applicable companion claims are limited because they must
be constitutionally protected, implicated by the free-exercise claim, and
reaching some colorable quality.216 Furthermore, hybrid claims require
affirmative compulsion, characterized as state-imposed symbolic speech, the
equivalent of censorship, or overriding parental control of a child’s religious
upbringing.217 Beyond these general requirements, further limitations exist
within specific variations of hybrid cases. In the communicative cases,
censorship must put the ability of the claimant to communicate at stake.218 For
example, the CLS case implicated such censorship only because the law
school’s policy eliminated communicative avenues on campus.219 In the
parental prong, the state’s overriding action is permissible if the state can show
a legitimate interest in the child’s health and public safety.220
Justice Souter’s second argument questioned the relevance of adding a
free-exercise claim to an independently viable claim that would alone warrant
an exemption.221 However, this argument ignores what hybrid-rights precedent
211. See infra Part III (discussing CLS).
212. See supra Part I.E.
213. See supra Part I.E.
214. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
215. See supra Part II.D & note 212.
216. See supra Parts II.B, II.D.1.
217. See supra Part II.C.
218. See supra Part II.D.2.
219. See Part III.A.
220. See supra Parts II.C, II.D.4.
221. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
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confirms: the free-exercise claim adds a plus factor that could otherwise be
unavailable on purely secular grounds.222 When a state’s action attempts to
override the parental interest in a child’s religious upbringing, barring safety
considerations, a parent can bring a claim that would not likely stand on purely
secular grounds.223 Similarly, the communicative context shows that less
protected forms of speech, such as commercial speech, could never provide the
same degree of relief that religiously based communication can under the
hybrid analysis.224 For example, in CLS, a non-religious school group would
be unable to engage in the religious discrimination that, under a hybrid
analysis, CLS could engage in, even if it wanted to or thought it necessary.225
IV. CONCLUSION
So long as Smith’s rule prohibiting religious exemptions to neutral, generally
applicable laws controls free-exercise claims, the Court’s only recognized
exception must possess a clear standard. Reading successful hybrid-rights
precedent through Smith’s lens reveals a standard comporting with the Court’s
language in Smith and illuminating circuit court ambiguity. Most importantly,
it provides a vibrant avenue of relief for the constitutional right given first
billing, but secondary treatment,226 in the Bill of Rights.

222. See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text. One scholar has criticized hybrid
rights by using Justice Souter’s second argument to support the contention that a hybrid-rights
theory, if valid, would allow religious speakers to claim greater constitutional protection than
secular speakers against otherwise neutral, generally applicable laws. See Alan Brownstein, Why
Conservatives, and Others, Have Trouble Supporting the Meaningful Enforcement of Free
Exercise Rights, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 925, 933 n.30 (2010). However, this argument
ignores the significance behind the constitutional enumeration of the free-exercise right. The
specific enumeration itself suggests an elevation above some other forms of communicative
exercise. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.
223. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
224. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.
225. CLS, 130B S. Ct. 2971, 3012 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“It bears emphasis that
permitting religious groups to limit membership to those who share the groups’ beliefs would not
have the effect of allowing other groups to discriminate on the basis of religion.”).
226. See, e.g., Vincent Martin Bonventre, The Fall of Free Exercise: From ‘No Law’ to
Compelling Interests to Any Law Otherwise Valid, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1399, 1415 (2007) (“The
Supreme Court majority in Smith acknowledged the inevitable burden on free exercise resulting
from its judicial passivity in protecting religious liberty. ‘[L]eaving accommodation to the
political process,’ Scalia conceded, ‘will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices
that are not widely engaged in.’ But he justified this as a ‘consequence of democratic government
[that] must be preferred’—preferred, apparently, to taking free exercise more seriously by
insuring more rigorous safeguards.” (quoting Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 Stat.
1488, 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as
recognized in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424
(2006))).
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